宏观金融博弈分析与我国货币政策实践  

Game theoretic analysis of macro-finance and the monetary policy practice of China

作　　者：王芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872

出　　处：《学习与探索》2001年第5期61-67,共7页Study & Exploration

摘　　要：西方经济学界将博弈分析方法推广到金融领域取得了理论成果，尤其以宏观金融博弈分析在２０世纪９０年代的最新发展为主要内容。完全信息动态博弈和不完全信息动态博弈两类模型，对货币政策的连贯性与可信度以及中央银行声誉做出了重新解释，货币政策目标、货币政策操作程序、中央银行独立性及政策透明度等热点问题在我国金融体制改革实践中的作用是至关重要的。The purpose of this article is to introduce the main application of game theory in finance from the western economic theorists. Particularly, the latest development of game analysis in mocro - finance in 1990s is discussed here. At the same time, the author tries to review China' s monetary policy practice since the financial system reform. She focuses on two main types of game models, dynamic game models with perfect information and those with imperfect information. These models provide an alternative explanation to the consistency and credibility of monetary policy and the reputation of central bank. Also, the author discusses several interesting issues in China's policy practice, such as target(s) and procedure of monetary policy, independency of central bank,and the transparency of its policy, etc.

关 键 词：宏观金融 博弈论 货币政策实践 

分 类 号：F821.0[经济管理—财政学] F224.32