设计施工联合体博弈合作——以设计变更条件下大型建设项目为例  

Game Cooperation of Design-construction Union Under Design Alteration

作　　者：柳丽娟[1] 苏义坤[1] 周晓冬[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北林业大学土木工程学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《土木工程与管理学报》2016年第3期87-93,共7页Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

基　　金："十二五"国家科技支撑计划(2012BAJ19B00)

摘　　要：建设项目的大型化和复杂化使得设计单位和施工单位联合的项目实施模式越来越多。但实践表明,联合体各参与单位合作过程中常因利益问题出现单方违约情况。系统归纳了设计变更的来源,引入超额收益、超额收益分配系数、违约额外收益、违约成本等影响因素,构造了不同设计变更来源下的设计施工联合体博弈模型,分析各参与单位的合作博弈策略选择,提出在合理的收益分配下,合作的净收益大于违约的净收益,设计施工联合体将选择合作策略;在不合理的收益分配下,合作的净收益小于违约的净收益,设计施工联合体中会出现违约情况。最后给出策略建议并进行实证分析,为设计施工联合体维持长久合作关系提供有益参考。With construction projects are becoming more and more complicated,many design units and construction units choose project implementation mode of combo. But practices indicate that participants often default unilaterally due to interest during cooperation. This paper concluded the design alteration sources systematically,and leaded into excess earnings and excess earnings partition coefficient and extra benefits obtained from default and default cost. It established game models about different design alteration sources, analyzed the cooperative game strategy choice about design-construction union in order to maintain the long cooperative relations,when cooperative net profit is more than the breach of contract net income under the reasonable income distribution,design and construction consortium choose cooperation strategy; when cooperative net profit is less than the breach of contract net income under the unreasonable income distribution,any design and construction consortium breaks the contract. It give some advices and empirical analysis to maintain cooperative relations between design units and construction units for a long time.

关 键 词：设计变更 设计施工联合体 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]