风险规避下研发外包中隐性知识共享的关系契约激励  

Relation Contract Incentive for Tacit Knowledge Sharing in R&D Outsourcing under Risk Averse Behavior

作　　者：宋寒[1] 代应[1] 祝静[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2016年第3期415-421,438,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301182;71201179);重庆市社会科学规划资助项目(2013YBGL119)

摘　　要：研发外包中隐性知识价值难以验证,以及服务商的风险规避行为,导致正式契约无法有效激励服务商隐性知识共享。针对该问题,构建非正式的关系契约激励机制,分析了服务商风险规避度等外生变量对关系契约的影响。研究表明,折现系数影响关系契约的可实施性,且临界折现系数是客户知识吸收能力的增函数,是服务商知识共享成本系数、服务商风险规避度、方差的减函数。外生变量对最优关系契约的收益共享系数的影响是单调的,而对固定支付的影响是非单调的,且在一定条件下固定支付表现服务商的反向保证金支付。The unverified value of the tacit knowledge and the service risk-averse behavior in RD outsourcing may result in the situation where the formal contract is not able to provide enough incentive for the service provider to share tacit knowledge.Informal relation contract incentive is proposed to tackle the problem,and the influences that the service risk-averse and other exogenous variables have on the relational contract are analyzed.The results show that the discounting factor influences the implementation of the relation contract and the critical discount coefficient is the increasing function of the knowledge absorption capacity of the customers and is the decreasing function of the coefficient of the knowledge sharing cost,service risk aversion,and the variance.The effects of the exogenous variable on the revenue sharing coefficient of the optimal relation contract are monotonous.However,the influences on the fixed payment are non-monotonic,and the fixed payment perform the negative margin under certain conditions.

关 键 词：研发外包 隐性知识共享 风险规避 关系契约 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]