信息不对称条件下煤矿企业安全监管激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism for Supervision in Coal Mine Enterprises with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：陈克贵[1] 宋学锋[2] 张明慧[1] 王新宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《系统工程》2016年第4期33-40,共8页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173216);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-12-0955);中国博士后科研基金资助项目(2015M570492);江苏省博士后科研基金资助项目(1401130C);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2014SJD411);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2015QNB05)

摘　　要：针对我国煤矿企业安全监管中监管机构和煤矿企业之间的信息不对称问题,考虑监管机构和煤矿企业形成委托代理关系,当煤矿企业真实安全技术水平和安全管理投入均为其私有信息而不为监管机构所共知时,监管机构如何设计有效的激励合同来甄别煤矿企业安全技术信息并对其安全管理投入实施有效激励,提出了逆向选择和道德风险并存下的双目标激励合同设计问题,分别给出混合策略和分离策略下的合同,进而对这两类合同做了特征刻画并论证了分离合同的有效性。研究结果表明,监管机构根据煤矿企业的安全水平不同提供的分离合同更有效。Considering the information asymmetry between supervisory authorities and coal mine enterprises in the safety supervision in China’s coal mine enterprises and considering the principal agent relationship between the supervisory authorities and the coal mine enterprises,this paper investigates a key problem that how the supervisory authorities can screen the true information of the coal mine enterprises’ safety technology level and can encourage them to invest to the safety management,when the coal mine enterprises’ safety technology type and safety investment are both of their private information.According to this problem,a bi-objective incentive contract design process is developed under adverse selection and moral hazard,the pooling and separating contracts are derived respectively,the effectiveness of these two types of contracts as well as characterizations are analyzed.The results indicate that the separating contracts,which the supervisory authorities provides for to different types of coal mine enterprises are more effective.

关 键 词：煤矿企业 安全监管 信息不对称 激励合同 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济] F224