“以心观心”是“二心”吗?——关于朱、陆之辨中意识自觉问题的辨正  

Does One Mind Observing the Other One Mean Two Minds?—Self-Knowledge of Consciousness in Discussions between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan

作　　者：陆畅[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州科技学院教育与公共管理学院,江苏苏州215009

出　　处：《新疆大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第3期116-121,共6页Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"儒教的传统形态与现代转型研究"(11BZJ038);江苏省社会科学基金青年项目"儒家良知思想的现代开展问题研究"(15ZXC001)

摘　　要：道德意识能否自觉、自知问题在朱、陆之辨中占据重要地位。朱子将象山的道德直觉视为"以心观心"的"二心",并误会其与佛教等同而加以批判。事实上,意向性活动中的意识与对其进行反思的意识是不存在共时性的,道德直觉不是以此察彼地对意识进行对象性反思,而是在无思无虑中依靠道德直觉使本心自我呈现。Whether or not moral consciousness can know itself plays an important role in the discussion between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan. The moral intuition was regarded by Zhu Xi as two minds, which means one mind observes the other, and was criticized by mistakenly considered equivalent to Buddhism. In fact, the consciousness of intentional activity and its reflection does not exist synchronously. Moral intuition is not the object reflection on consciousness as subject observing object, but the one that make the true ~ntention presents itself through the moral intuition in unconsciousness state.

关 键 词：以心观心 主客对待 自证自知 道德直觉 无思无虑 

分 类 号：I0-02[文学—文学理论]