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作 者:谭冕 何世彪[1] 宋波[1] 杨刚[1] 张晖[1]
机构地区:[1]重庆通信学院,重庆400035 [2]后勤工程学院,重庆401331
出 处:《重庆邮电大学学报(自然科学版)》2016年第3期342-348,共7页Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Natural Science Edition)
基 金:重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(cstc2014jcyj A40051)~~
摘 要:针对无线ad hoc网络中节点在数据转发阶段可能的自私行为,利用博弈理论从静态进行分析,以相邻节点对为研究对象,在重复博弈的情况下分析了针锋相对策略的脆弱性,提出了一种改进的针锋相对策略,在理论上证明了改进策略的激励性。改进策略可以容忍一定程度的网络故障,并在故障发生后使节点重新回到合作状态。仿真结果证明,改进策略对网络故障的容忍度较好,有效地促使节点合作,得到较高的网络收益,同时也降低了自私节点的收益。According to possible selfish behaviors of wireless ad hoc network nodes showed during the process of data trans forming and analyzing from static state based on game theory, this paper regards neighboring nodes as the researched object, and analyzes the fragility of Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated game. This paper proposes an improved Tit-for-Tat strategy, and proves incentive of improved strategy theoretically. This improved strategy can tolerate a certain degree of network failure, and can restart nodes into cooperation status again after failure happened. The simulation results show that the improved strategyhas a better network fault tolerance compared with several other strategies, prompts node cooperation more effectively, gets higher node payoffs, reduces the interests of selfish nodes.
关 键 词:无线AD HOC网络 完美信息博弈 针锋相对 自私节点 网络故障
分 类 号:TN92[电子电信—通信与信息系统]
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