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机构地区:[1]上海证券交易所博士后工作站,上海200120 [2]中国邮政储蓄银行总行办公室,北京100808 [3]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029
出 处:《南京审计大学学报》2016年第3期30-43,共14页Journal of Nanjing Audit University
基 金:国家自然科学基金重点项目(71332008);中国博士后科学基金第57批面上项目(2015M571593)
摘 要:使用我国上市公司2007—2012年数据,就产品市场竞争和竞争地位对经理人盈余管理行为(具体包括应计盈余管理行为和真实活动盈余管理行为)的影响进行研究,发现产品市场竞争和竞争地位对上市公司经理人的应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理都具有重要影响。具体而言,在其他条件相同的情况下,上市公司所处行业的集中度越低,产品市场竞争越激烈,其应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理程度都越高;上市公司在行业内所处的竞争地位(定价力量和市场份额)对其盈余管理的影响则较为复杂,在行业内拥有较强定价力量的上市公司,更倾向于通过应计盈余管理调高利润,而在行业内所占市场份额较高的上市公司,更倾向于通过真实活动盈余管理来操纵利润。Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2012,this paper studies the impact of product market competition and competitive position on managers' earnings management behavior,including accrual earnings management and real earnings management. The result shows that product market competition and competitive position of listed companies have important influence on managers' accrual earnings management and real activity earnings management in listed companies.Specifically,the lower the concentration degree of listed company,the more intense the competition in the product market,the higher the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management. The effect of competitive position( pricing power and market share) of listed companies in the industry is more complex,companies with strong pricing power are more inclined to use accrual earnings management to increase profit,while the companies taking higher shares in the industry are more inclined to use real activities earnings management to manipulate profits.
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