科技型中小企业与银行的融资博弈分析——以南通市金融示范区为例  

Game Analysis of Financing of Banking and High-tech SMEs:A Case Study of Nantong Financial Demonstration Zone

作　　者：谭佳婧 许景[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211816 [2]江苏省科技政策思想库,江苏南京211816

出　　处：《南京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第2期111-115,共5页Journal of Nanjing Tech University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：江苏省发展和改革委员会基金项目

摘　　要：近年来,科技型中小企业与银行的融资问题一直是国家急需解决的重要难题。科技型中小企业组织创新效率最高、转型最快、经济发展能力强、促进就业等优点使它成为中国经济发展中不可或缺的关键力量。通过建立政府干预和不干预情况下科技型中小企业与银行的融资博弈模型,对科技型中小企业与银行间的关系进行分析,得出对潜在发展的科技型中小企业来说,政府干预是较优的贷款策略,并结合南通市金融示范区的成功案例说明银行与中小企业博弈中政府扶持的重要性。In recent years,the financing of S&T SMEs in China has remained an urgent problem. Advantages of SMEs,including the highest efficiency in organizational innovation and fastest transition speed,strong economic development capacity and employment opportunities,make SMEs indispensable key force in China' s economic development. Based on the successful case of Nantong Financial Demonstration Zone,a financing game model is constructed with and without government intervention between high-tech SMEs and banks,the relationship between SMEs and the bank being analyzed and the result shows that for SMEs with potential development,government intervention is the optimum loaning strategy and the importance of government support for SMEs gaming is demonstrated.

关 键 词：科技型中小企业 融资博弈 科技金融 政府干预 南通市金融示范区 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]