危机前后资产证券化监管思路的重大转变及启示  

Significant Changes of Regulation on Asset Securitization before and after the Financial Crisis and the Lessons

作　　者：李文红[1] 刘丽娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国银行业监督管理委员会业务创新监管协作部

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2016年第4期1-12,共12页Financial Regulation Research

摘　　要：此次全球金融危机之后,国际上对于资产证券化的监管思路发生了重大转变。危机前,资产证券化监管重在促进发起机构最大程度地转移基础资产及其相关风险,最理想的状况是全部出售基础资产和完全转移风险。危机后,为了缓解资产证券化存在的逆向选择、道德风险和激励不相容等问题,金融稳定理事会提出由发起机构保留部分基础资产风险的建议,美国和欧盟等国家/地区陆续发布了强制要求发起机构自留部分资产支持证券的监管规定。"促进风险转移"与"要求保留一定风险"看似矛盾,但反映了监管者力求在通过资产证券化转移风险与强化发起机构贷款管理责任之间寻求恰当的平衡。在此基础上,本文进一步梳理了危机后提出资产证券化风险自留要求的理论依据,对国内外的风险自留监管和相关豁免规定进行了比较,并以此探讨对我国资产证券化监管的借鉴意义。After the global financial crisis,significant changes have occurred in the international regulations on asset securitization.Before the crisis,the regulations had focused on promotion for originators to transfer underlying assets and the related risks as much as possible with the perfect condition of assets sold-out and complete risk transfer.After the crisis,the Financial Stability Board has proposed that the originators should retain part of the assets’ risks to mitigate the problem of adverse selection,moral risk and misaligned incentives in asset securitization.Some countries and regions such as United States and the European Union also have issued regulations which require mandatory risk retention of originators.The significant changes from risk transfer to risk retention,which seem inconsistent,have actually reflected the authority’s efforts on the balance between risk transfer through asset securitization and originators’ responsibility for loan management.Furthermore,we have reviewed the theoretical fundamentals for risk retention,compared risk retention and exemptions among different countries,and concluded lessons for China’s asset securitization regulation.

关 键 词：资产证券化监管 风险自留与豁免 逆向选择、道德风险和激励不相容 

分 类 号：F831.59[经济管理—金融学]