内部控制质量、产品市场竞争与分析师预测  

Internal Quality Control,Product Market Competition and Analyst Forecast

作　　者：赵洁[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [2]内蒙古财经大学会计学院,呼和浩特010070

出　　处：《浙江工商大学学报》2016年第3期80-92,共13页Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang University

摘　　要：在财务报告特定使用者视角下,本文对内部控制质量、产品市场竞争与分析师预测行为之间的关系进行了探讨,研究发现:当公司内部控制质量较高时,分析师盈余预测精确度较高而预测离散度较小;分析师对内部控制信息发布后问题少的公司追踪较多;产品市场竞争对于内部控制质量与分析师行为之间的关系起到了一定的替代作用。本文的研究表明内部控制的完善及内部控制信息披露均有利于缓解信息不对称局面,对资本市场优化信息环境具有重要的意义。本文的结论为内部控制经济后果领域研究提供了进一步的证据。From the perspective of the specified users of the financial statement,this paper explores the relationship between the internal quality control,products＇ market competition and analyst forecast. The results show that with relatively higher internal quality control,the earnings forecast precision is higher and the dispersion of the variation is less; the analysts tend to trace more on the enterprises with fewer problems after the release of the internal control information; the products＇ market competition has some substituting effect on the relationship between internal quality control and the analyst behaviors. The results in this paper reveal that the improvement of the internal control and the release of the internal control information help to alleviate the asymmetry of information,which has meaningful significance on the information optimization of the capital market.The findings in this paper further offer evidence for the research of internal control of economic benefits.

关 键 词：内部控制质量 产品市场竞争 分析师预测 信息披露机制 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]