基于前景理论的商业贿赂治理分析  

Analysis of Commercial Bribery Governance Based On Prospect Theory

作　　者：王德华[1] 韩秀华[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏省社会科学院财贸研究所,江苏南京210013 [2]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488

出　　处：《福建行政学院学报》2016年第3期83-92,共10页Journal of Fujian Administration Institute

基　　金：国家自然科学基金应急管理项目(71441032)

摘　　要：商业贿赂作为有风险的决策行为,在现实中与理性人的假设存在偏差,是传统的期望效用理论和博弈理论不能解释的现象。将商业贿赂转化为供给方与需求方交易的经济学问题,并引入前景理论以更贴近实际风险决策中的行为,通过构建商业贿赂的前景博弈模型,深入研究商业贿赂治理的实际影响因素。结果表明,治理商业贿赂需要采取综合措施,在压缩贿赂空间、提高发现概率和加大惩罚力度三个因素之间寻找有效组合,才能有效遏制商业贿赂的滋生蔓延。As a risky decision-making behavior,Commercial bribery which in reality is deviated from the hypothesis of rational person,can not be explained according to traditional expected utility theory and game theory.In this paper,commercial bribery is transformed into economics of supply side and demand side of the transaction,and the prospect theory which is more close to the actual risk decision-making behavior is introduced,then based on the constructed prospect game model of commercial bribery,the actual influence factors of commercial bribery governance are studied.The results show that,comprehensive measures must be taken to govern commercial bribery and the effective combination must be found among compressing bribery space,improving detection probability and increasing the punishment,only then can the spread of commercial bribery effectively be prevented.

关 键 词：前景理论 商业贿赂 贿赂空间 

分 类 号：F299.21[经济管理—国民经济]