控制权、现金流权与股价同步性  

Stock Price Synchronicity and the Separation of Ownership between Control Rights

作　　者：王立章[1] 王咏梅[2] 王志诚[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行济南分行,山东济南250021 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《金融研究》2016年第5期97-110,共14页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：云南省省院省校教育合作项目“云南省农业产业化龙头企业风险管理研究”(编号:SYSX201309)资助

摘　　要：本文运用我国A股上市公司2003~2013年的数据,研究了两权分离度（控制权和现金流权）对通过股价同步性所刻画的市场信息传递的阻隔程度。研究结果发现：首先,两权分离度和实际控制人性质与股价同步性正相关,而股权制衡度与股价同步性负相关;其次,实际控制人的国有性质以及股权制衡度的提高显著降低了两权分离对股价同步性的正向影响。研究结果表明,上市公司中两权分离度高、国有性质以及股权制衡度低等股权结构特征会降低公司信息披露的水平和质量,影响公司的信息透明度,从而降低股价中包含的公司特质信息,导致较高的股价同步性水平,最终影响证券市场的运行效率。This paPer examines the financial market information barrier effects of the separation of ownership and control of Chinese a-share listed firms over the 2003 -2013 period. The results show that the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights and the nature of controlling shareholders have positive correlation with stock price synchronicity, while ownership balance and stock price synchronicity are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the nature of state-owned company can significantly reduce the positive impact of the separation on stock price synchronicity. The separation of cash flow rights from voting rights, and state-owned and low level ownership balance will reduce the level and effectiveness of financial disclosure, so as bring about synchronicity and reduce market efficiency.

关 键 词：两权分离 股价同步性 实际控制人 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275