股价泡沫真的会影响公司资本投资吗?——基于股权融资机制和迎合机制的实证检验  

The Influence of Stock Price Bubble upon Corporate Capital Investment: Empirical Test of the Equity Channel and the Catering Channel

作　　者：屈文洲[1] 叶震南 闫丽梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2016年第6期33-41,共9页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金"金融资产泡沫的形成机理;度量方法与经济后果--基于中国证券市场的理论与实证研究"(2010J06019);国家自然科学基金"全球金融风暴背景下中国企业财务决策行为研究"(70972110)

摘　　要：本文利用股权融资机制和迎合机制重新审视了中国上市公司的投资-泡沫敏感性问题。通过分解托宾q获得泡沫q作为股价泡沫的代理变量以研究中国A股市场股价泡沫对上市公司真实投资的影响及其作用途径。研究发现无论是融资约束组还是非融资约束组的企业,投资支出率对泡沫均具有正向敏感性,且融资约束组比非融资约束组更容易被高估,泡沫水平更高。迎合机制是非融资约束组股价泡沫对投资产生影响的主要作用途径,而融资约束组的企业,投资支出率对泡沫的正向敏感性由股权机制引起。This paper reinvestigates the investment-bubble sensitivity of listed firms in China. By using bubble q as a proxy of bubble which will be decomposed from Tobin＇s q, we do research on the effect of A-share stock market bubble in real investment of listed companies and the mechanism that stock market bubble might influence individual firms＇ investment decisions. The results show that financially constrained firms, which have a higher bubble level, are more likely to be overvalued than financially unconstrained firms. According to the study, financially unconstrained group show a strong investment-bubble sensitivity through catering channel, induced by agency costs, while those that are financially constrained don＇t. Further studies show that financially constrained firms with new shares issued show a strong investment-bubble sensitivity, entirely through equity channel.

关 键 词：股价泡沫 公司投资 迎合机制 股权机制 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]