铁路物流服务链联盟的加盟制与利益分配  

Franchise Pattern and Profit Allocation of Railway Logistic Service Chain Alliance

作　　者：齐新宇[1] 阎岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学汽车与交通学院,山东青岛266520

出　　处：《铁道运输与经济》2016年第6期1-4,22,共5页Railway Transport and Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71471094)

摘　　要：我国铁路运输企业以铁路运输服务为基础,拓展物流服务范围,可以利用"加盟制"获得外部其他企业相应的服务能力,迅速构建综合物流服务链。在阐述加盟制的形式,以及以加盟制构建综合物流服务链联盟的优势与不足的基础上,运用博弈论基本原理,提出将"威胁-合作"博弈机制用于联盟利益分配,即铁路运输企业利用联盟中的主导地位,分享综合服务链联盟的最大利益。Chinese railway transport enterprise expands its logistic service scope by taking railway transport service as the foundation, and could get corresponding service capacity from other external enterprise by using ＂franchise pattern＂ and rapidly establish comprehensive logistic service chain. Based on expounding the form of franchise pattern and the advantages and deficiencies of establishing comprehensive logistic service chain alliance through the franchise pattern, by using the basic principle of game theory, this paper puts forward that the game mechanism of ＂threat-cooperation＂ was applied on profit allocation of the alliance, which means railway transport enterprise sharing maximum profit of comprehensive service chain alliance by using its leading position in the alliance.

关 键 词：铁路 物流 加盟制 利益分配 博弈 

分 类 号：F252.2[经济管理—国民经济]