具有长期性特征的恐怖袭击与政府反恐多阶段重复博弈模型  

Multi-phase Repeated Game Model between Terrorists and Government Anti-terrorism with Long-term Characteristic

作　　者：刘德海[1] 邹华伟[1] 鲍雪言 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学,大连116025

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2016年第3期19-23,共5页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71171035;71271045;71571033);辽宁省教育厅科学研究一般项目(L2015164);东北财经大学学科建设支持计划公共安全治理特色学科项目(XKT-201411)

摘　　要：我国反恐问题具有长期性特征,以Hausken和Zhuang的动态博弈模型作为阶段博弈,在此基础上构建了政府防御方与恐怖分子的多阶段重复博弈模型。通过数值分析方法,分别讨论了双方对于未来长远收益重视程度、恐怖分子培训与实施袭击成本、政府防御目标估值等因素对于恐怖分子的期望收益和恐怖袭击次数的影响。Terrorism represented by the ＂three forces＂ has become one of the long-term challenges for Chinese society, especially for Xinjiang region. Chinese anti-terrorism combat has the long-term characteristics. Considering the long-term characteristics of anti-terrorism, the paper builds a multi-phase repeated game model between government and terrorists, where Hausken and Zhuang＇s dynamic game model has been taken as the stage game model. Using numerical experiments, we discussed the influence of the attention for future long-term income, the terrorists＇ attacking cost, and the government＇s valuation of the targeted asset on terrorists＇ expected utility and the number of attacking time.

关 键 词：恐怖主义 多阶段重复博弈 长期性 政府反恐 袭击次数 

分 类 号：D815.5[政治法律—国际关系]