契约执行力与产业结构:来自中国工业企业的证据  

Contract Enforcement and Industrial Structure:Evidence from China's Industrial Enterprises

作　　者：李俊青[1] 刘帅光[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院

出　　处：《世界经济》2016年第6期124-148,共25页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(14AJL010);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划;天津市131第一层次人才支持计划;南开大学百名青年学科带头人培养计划;南开大学财富与经济研究院;南开大学博士研究生科研创新基金(68150003)的资助;中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心

摘　　要：制造业的发展离不开外部融资,而契约执行力能够影响企业和金融机构之间的合作程度,进而影响制造业内部和金融业与制造业之间的产业结构。本文通过建立动态一般均衡模型来考察契约执行力对产业结构的影响机制,并利用2007年中国工业企业数据和1997-2009年省际面板数据,采用Rajan和Zingales(1998)的交互项模型考察契约执行力对产业结构的影响。研究结果表明,在控制其他影响产业结构的变量后,契约执行力的改善不仅提高了制造业中资本密集型行业的比重,而且提升了金融业与制造业的相对比重。The development of manufacturing industry is inseparable from external fi- nance. Enforcement of contracts matters when it comes to the cooperation between enterprises and financial institutions, and hence affects the industrial structure within manufacturing industry and that between the manufacturing industry and the finance industry. This paper develops a dynamic growth equilibrium （DGE） model to illustrate how contract enforcement works. Based on the provincial panel data of Chinese industrial enterprises from 1997 to 2009, we measure the effect of contract enforcement on industrial structure via the interaction terms from Rajan and Zingales （ 1998 ）. The empirical results exhibit that the improvement of contract enforcement not only raises the proportion of capital-intensive industry in manufacturing industry, but also enhances the relative ratio of finance industry to manufacturing industry.

关 键 词：契约执行力 产业结构 动态一般均衡 

分 类 号：F424[经济管理—产业经济] F832.4