委托代理视角下跨国公司子公司治理对策的研究  

Study on the Management Strategy for the Subsidiaries of Multinational Companies under the Perspective of Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：向新渝[1] 李云飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]西华师范大学数学与信息学院,四川南充637009

出　　处：《西华师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2016年第2期210-213,共4页Journal of China West Normal University(Natural Sciences)

摘　　要：两权分离导致委托代理关系的产生,因此跨国公司的母公司与子公司之间也可以看作是一种委托代理关系。通过对跨国公司委托代理模型的分析,建立并求解了委托人与代理人之间的监管模型,最后在此基础上提出了对跨国公司子公司治理对策的建议。The separation of two rights leads to principal-agent relationship,thus the relationship between parent and subsidiary of the multinational company can also be regarded as a form of principal-agent relationship. Through the analysis of the principal-agent model for multinational companies,this paper builds the model for supervising the relationship between the principal and agent,and finally advances the countermeasure suggestion for multinational companies to govern their subsidiaries.

关 键 词：跨国公司 委托代理 子公司 监管模型 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]