基于研发-广告的三级供应链博弈-合作模型研究  

A Three- level Supply Chain Game- cooperation Model Based on Cooperation of R&D and Advertisement

作　　者：徐芬[1] 徐伟[2] 

机构地区：[1]马鞍山职业技术学院经济系,马鞍山243002 [2]南京审计大学国际审计学院,南京211815

出　　处：《辽东学院学报（自然科学版）》2016年第2期140-145,共6页Journal of Eastern Liaoning University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金项目(31300125);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(2015SJB199)

摘　　要：利用生产函数和边际效益递减规律,构造了4类基于研发-广告合作的博弈-合作型三级供应链模型,并采用多种数学方法给出了模型最优解的存在性与求解方法。最后对模型进行了仿真分析,结果说明无论是在相对稳定型还是在风险型市场条件下,集中博弈型供应链也有可能比分散博弈型供应链整体利润小,改变了人们的通常想法。其实主要是这里的完全合作型供应链契约存在缺陷,造成某些弱小成员过剩投资。Four kinds of three- level supply chain game- cooperation models based on the cooperation of RD and advertisement were built with production function and the progressively diminishing law of marginal benefit. The existence of their optimal solutions of the models and the corresponding approaches were discussed by using various mathematic methods. Simulation analysis of the models was also conducted. The results show that the overall profit of centralized game supply chain is possibly less than that of separate game supply chain whether under stable or risky market conditions,which is different from our usual view. Actually,the defect in contract of the perfect cooperation supply chain leads to overinvestment of some puny members.

关 键 词：供应链 博弈 合作 研发 投资 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]