安全农产品的供给机制与“四位一体”中国农产品质量安全保障体系的优化策略——基于博弈理论的分析  

The Supply Mechanism of Safe Agricultural Products and " Four-in-One" System On the Optimization of Supply Mechanism of Safe Agri-foods:Based on the Game Theory

作　　者：付陈梅[1] 李敬[2] 刘洋[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054 [2]重庆社会科学院科研处,重庆400020 [3]西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400716

出　　处：《徐州工程学院学报（社会科学版）》2016年第4期55-60,共6页Journal of Xuzhou Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"空间关联视角下中国农产品质量安全的宏观影响因素与源头治理机制研究"(15AJY013);国家社会科学基金一般项目"中国农产品质量安全保障体系研究"(09BJY070)

摘　　要：通过建立多种条件下的博弈理论模型,系统揭示了安全农产品的供给机制。并结合实际,提出"四位一体"中国农产品质量安全保障体系的优化策略。研究发现:(1)当农产品质量信息对称时,消费者支付给生产者的报酬等于保留收入和基于质量安全的努力成本,体现出"一份付出得到一份收获"。同时,生产者的质量安全努力与农产品数量成正比,与成本系数成反比。(2)信息不对称是阻碍安全农产品供给的最大"绊脚石"。当信息不对称时,生产者对于质量安全的努力水平严格低于对称信息下的水平,农产品质量安全水平必然有所下降。(3)有效运行的农产品质量标准与认证体系、农产品质量检测与监督体系和农产品质量风险评估与预警体系可以提供反映农产品质量的"信号因子",从而提高农产品质量安全水平。Based on the game theory models under various conditions,this paper revealed the mechanism of supply of safe agri-foods systematically.The conclusions were：（1）Under symmetry information,the rewards that consumers paid to the producers equal to the base income and efforts cost of QS（quality safety）which embodies＇ no pay no gain＇.Meanwhile,the effort of QS from producers was in proportion to quantities of agri-foods and in inverse proportion to cost coefficient.（2）When the information is asymmetric,the producer＇s effort level of quality safety is lower than that of the symmetric information,and the quality and safety level of agricultural products must be reduced.（3）The effectiveness of quality standards and safety certification system,quality inspection and supervision system,quality risk assessment and early warning system of agri-foods can provide signal factor to reflect the quality of agri-foods,thus improve the QS of agri-foods.At last,optimization strategies for the quality system with＇four-in-one＇of agri-food products were proposed.

关 键 词：农产品 质量安全 博弈理论 供给机制 优化策略 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]