招商引资后续风险的路径依赖:政府管理经济事务的行为偏差  

Path Dependence of the Following Risk of Attracting Investment:Behavior Deviation in the Government's Management of Economic Affairs

作　　者：吴金忠[1] 翁洪服[1] 李配法[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行临沂市中心支行,山东临沂276004 [2]中国人民银行蒙阴县支行,山东蒙阴276200

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2016年第6期43-47,共5页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：本文剖析了H县对欠薪、跑路的某公司风险事件管理的全过程后发现,地方政府仍囿于招商引资的路径依赖,采用直接干预的手法,袒护处于低端产业且具有明显道德风险的涉险企业,干预了金融和司法部门的正常决策,使整个风险处置活动陷于无序和低效率状态。Through analyzing the whole process of the risk management of a company in county H which withheld pay and got away, this paper finds that the local government is still confined to its path dependence of attracting invest- ment. It adopts the method of direct intervention and protect the local enterprises which are in the low end of the indus- try and has obvious moral risks. It intervenes in the normal policy-decision of the financial and judicial departments, thus putting the whole risk management process into a state of disorder and low efficiency.

关 键 词：招商引资 路径依赖 政府角色 效率偏差 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]