基于需求依赖库存的多制造商供应链博弈与协调模型  

Game and Coordination Models for Supply Chains with Multiple Manufacturers under Inventory-Dependent Demand

作　　者：付娟[1] 闵杰[2] 赵菊[3] 欧剑[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽建筑大学管理学院,安徽合肥230601 [2]安徽建筑大学数理学院,安徽合肥230601 [3]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第3期195-201,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101002;71201044;71072165);合肥工业大学博士学位专项基金资助项目(2012HGBZ0197)

摘　　要：考虑一个具有决策优先优势的零售商,如大型超市,同时销售两个制造商的同类产品,研究了这类两层非一体化供应链的博弈和协调问题。假设商品需求依赖自己的库存展示水平和竞争对手的库存水平。博弈过程中,零售商是决策的先行动者,首先宣布库存展示策略,两个制造商作为跟随者,然后决定相应的策略。根据两个制造商决策顺序的不同,建立了两个模型,一个是两制造商同时反应的Nash均衡博弈;另一个是两制造商先后反应的Stackelberg主从博弈。分析了制造商及其竞争对手的库存量对需求的影响和供应链各方利润变化情况,得到了一些管理启示。另外,给出了量折扣策略实现供应链协调。最后,数值算例结果验证了该模型的有效性。This paper considers the game and coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain consisted of two manufacturers and a dominant retailer, such as supermarket. Two manufacturers produce similar items and sell them by the same retailer. Assume that the demand of each item is not only dependent on its own inventory level displayed on shelf but also on its competitor＇s. Therefore, the two manufacturers compete for the same shelf space. First, the retailer declares its shelf display policy. The two manufacturers, as followers, then make their actions. According to the different order of making decision, two supply chain game models are developed, namely Nash equilibrium game, in which they take actions at same time, and Stackelberg game, in which they take actions in sequence. We then analyze the effect of a manufacturer＇s own and its competitor＇s inventories on production＇s sale rate and profit of supply chain players. Some managerial insights are shown as follows： （1） With the increasing of the impact factor of its own inventory on the demand （denoted by b）, both the displayed quantities and the demands of the two productions increase, and the wholesale prices also increase. （2） The increasing of b will benefit the supply chain as a whole, especially for manufacturers. （3） With the increasing of the impact factor of its competitor＇s inventory on the demand （denoted by θ）, both the displayed quantities and the demands decrease. The wholesale prices decrease in Nash game but increase in Stackelberg game. （4） The increasing of θ will be unfavorable for manufacturers. （5） The late-mover advantage is proven, In addition, quantity discount policy is given to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples show that the models are considerable effective in improving supply chain efficiency and coordinating supply chains.

关 键 词：需求依赖库存 供应链 博弈 协调 

分 类 号：O221[理学—运筹学与控制论]