企业类型、R&D溢出与环境税政策选择——基于完全信息动态博弈模型  

Environmental Technical Cooperation, Product Differentiation and Environmental Tax Policy Selection: A Dynamic Game Model with Complete Information

作　　者：赵娜[1] 李香菊[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,西安710061

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2016年第7期65-76,共12页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14BJY168)

摘　　要：基于双寡头博弈模型,研究政府不同的环境税政策、企业污染类型、环保R&D溢出对企业最优环境税率、污染控制率及社会福利的影响。得出以下主要结论:当企业为重污染或者企业为轻污染、政府实行承诺的环境税政策时最优环境税率随着边际损害程度增加而增加并逐渐收敛;而当企业为轻污染、政府实行不承诺的环境税政策时,政府有必要对企业从事环保采取补贴的措施。在企业为重污染、R&D存在溢出的情况下,承诺的环境税政策及鼓励企业R&D合作是政府最优选择;在其他情况下,无论企业是R&D竞争还是R&D合作方式,承诺的环境税政策可以实现企业污染控制率最大。This paper investigates the influence of government＇s different environmental tax policies, the type of enterprise and environmental R＆D spillover on pollution control, environmental tax rate and social welfare in Cournot duopoly. The main results are： The optimal environmental tax rate is increasing with the increase of the extent of the damage of the pollutant and gradually converges to a value if the enterprise is heavily polluted, alternative- ly, given the enterprise being lightly polluted and the government＇s commitment to the environmental tax policy. It is necessary for the government to give enterprise environmental subsidy when the enterprise is lightly polluted and the government commit to a specific level of environmental policy instrument. As the enterprise is heavily polluted and there is R＆D spillover, the commitment environmental tax policies and enterprises＇ R＆D cooperation is the best choice for the government. However, if there is either R＆D competition or R＆D cooperation, in contrast to results of previous studies, innovation effort can be the highest under government commitment.

关 键 词：企业类型 R&D溢出 政府不承诺 政府承诺 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]