中国人民银行入宪路径分析  

Research on the People's Bank of China into Constitution

作　　者：陈云良[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学法学院 [2]中南大学法治湖南建设与区域社会治理协同创新中心

出　　处：《政法论坛》2016年第4期35-45,共11页Tribune of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社科基金项目<转轨经济法:西方范式与中国现实之抉择>(11BFX041)成果

摘　　要：中央银行通过不断地演变,已经成为制约政府货币扩张的有效力量,世界晚近宪法中纷纷对中央银行的独立性予以规定,使其市场调控力获得合法性。中国人民银行1983年成为真正的中央银行,1995年获得法律上的独立性。但这样一个重要的国家机关却在宪法中找不到根据,其地位经由法律确定之后却被修宪者遗忘,不能不说这是一个重大的宪法缺陷。中国人民银行入宪有两种路径选择,一种是简单地加入到宪法第18条;另一种则是在宪法中明确将其定性为独立机构。The central bank has played an important role in restricting monetary expansion of government through continuous evolvement. The independence of central bank has regulated in most Constitutions in recent years, which established its legality in market regulation. The People＇ s Bank of China has become the real central bank in 1983, and obtained its legal independence in 1995. However, such an important state organ has no legal basis in the Constitution. Although its status has confirmed by law, it is the significant defect in the Constitution that People＇ s Bank of China was forgotten in previous constitution amendments. There are two path choices for the People＇ s Bank of China into the Constitution, one is to simply add the regulation in Arti- cle 18 of the Constitution; and the other is to explicitly stipulate it as an independent agency in the Constitution.

关 键 词：中央银行 宪法 国家调节权 

分 类 号：D921[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]