农村公共品供给中乡镇政府的角色悖论及其行为选择  

The Role Paradox and Behavior Choice of Township Government in Rural Public Goods Supply

作　　者：徐晨[1] 王振亚[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学政治经济学院,陕西西安710062

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第4期65-72,共8页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13XDJ021)

摘　　要："职能-行为"的传统分析框架忽视了"利益"这一影响行为选择的原生性变量,不足以解释农村公共品供给中乡镇政府的行为模式,因而有必要用"利益-行为"的分析框架予以补正;场化进程与分权式改革使乡镇政府成为具有自身利益的相对独立的利益主体,并强化了其工具理性,拓展了其行动空间,从而引发了公共品供给中的角色冲突和行为失范;乡镇政府的行为选择,不仅受各种客观因素的影响,更受自身独立利益的驱动,归根结底是多重角色利益互动博弈的结果。The traditional analytical framework ＂Function -Behavior＂has ignored the original variable ＂interests＂which affects the behavior choice.Therefore,it is insufficient to explain the behavior pattern of the township government in rural public goods supply and the ＂Interests -Behavior＂analytical framework is needed for correction.Owing to the marketization and decentralization reform,the township government has become the relatively independent subject of in-terests,strengthened the instrumental rationality and expanded the action space,leading to role conflict and the behavior anomie in the public goods supply.Besides the various objective factors,the behavior choice of township government is also driven by its individual interests.Ultimately,it is the result of multiple role interests game.

关 键 词：农村公共品 乡镇政府 角色冲突 行为逻辑 

分 类 号：C912.82[经济管理] D63[社会学]