非对称公平关切下供应链最优决策研究  

Research on the Optimal Decision of Supply Chain in Asymmetry of Fairness Concern

作　　者：曹二保[1,2] 侯利梅 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院 [2]湖南省物流信息与仿真技术重点实验室

出　　处：《管理学报》2016年第7期1070-1074,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001035;71420107027);教育部新世纪人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-13-0181)

摘　　要：考虑零售商的公平关切为其私有信息,基于委托代理理论研究公平关切对供应链最优决策的影响。研究表明:在非对称公平关切下,零售商的最优订货量及效用随其公平关切程度的增加而递减;制造商的期望利润随零售商公平关切程度或零售商保留效用的增加而递减;在对称公平关切下,零售商的最优订货量与其公平关切程度无关,零售商仅获得其保留效用;制造商的期望利润与零售商的公平关切程度无关。This study investigates the influence of fairness concern information on the optimal decision of supply chain based on Principal-agent theory,considering the retailer＇s fairness concern is its private information and unknown for the manufacturer.Results show that the retailer＇s optimal order quantity and utility decrease with the increase of the retailer＇s fairness concern while the manufacturer＇s expected profit decreases with the increase of the retailer＇s fairness concern or the retailer＇s reservation utility,while the optimal order quantity is independent of the retailer＇s fairness concern and the retailer only gains the reservation utility and the manufacturer＇s expected profit is not relevant to fairness concern under symmetric information case.

关 键 词：信息非对称 供应链 公平关切 委托代理 博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]