合同节水管理利益分配研究  

Profit Allocation of Contract Management Mode for Water Conservation Based on Cooperative Game

作　　者：尹庆民[1] 刘德艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京211100

出　　处：《节水灌溉》2016年第7期73-76,共4页Water Saving Irrigation

基　　金：江苏省社会科学基金项目"江苏海洋经济发展中的港口岸线资源代际配置研究"(12EYB004)

摘　　要：合同节水管理引入社会化资本,具有广阔的应用前景,而其利益分配机制不健全成为实施推广的主要障碍之一。通过分析合同节水管理的主要利益相关者及其相互之间的博弈关系,选取能够较好解决多方博弈利益分配的Shapley模型对合同节水管理利益分配模式进行探索研究,并进行实证分析,得出合同节水管理的利益分配模式:节水用户得到最高收益分配,其次是节水服务公司与资金提供者。研究对合同节水管理的推广具有实际指导意义。The introduction of social capital of contract management mode for water conservation has broad application prospects,while its benefit distribution mechanism is not perfect,which becomes one of the main obstacles for the implementation of the promotion.By analyzing the relationship between the major stakeholders of contract management mode for water conservation and their mutual correlation,the Shapley model is used to explore and study the interest distribution pattern of contract management mode for water conservation.The result has practical significance for the promotion of contract management model for water conservation.

关 键 词：利益分配 合同节水管理 节水服务公司 Shapley模型 

分 类 号：S27[农业科学—农业水土工程] TV213.4[农业科学—农业工程]