一元股东权利配置的内在缺陷与变革思路  

Unitary Allocation of Stockholders' Rights in China: Inner Defects and Reform Thoughts

作　　者：汪青松[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学民商法学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第8期64-71,共8页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金<经营者集中的附条件批准制度研究>(批准号:12CFX068);国家法治与法学理论研究项目<营商自由与商事主体制度研究>(批准号:15SFB2032);西南政法大学引进人才项目资助

摘　　要：中国股份公司股东权利配置制度以一系列强制性规范为主体,形成了实质上的法定一元化配置模式,相应的股份类型也仅表现为单一的普通股。这种股东权利配置模式的逻辑基础包括抽象资本层面的股份平等、股东同质化假定、基于两权分离的代理理论以及股东权利结构完整性原则。但法定的一元化配置模式也存在着诸多内在缺陷,诸如股东权利配置无法体现公司自治理念、单一股份类型无法满足股东异质偏好、股东权利行使结果与平等初衷相背离以及中小股东权益保护源头机制的缺失。因此,推动股东权利配置模式从一元走向多元应该成为中国公司法下一步改革的重要内容。For allocating stockholders' rights in Joint Stock Corporation,Company Law of China uses a series of mandatory rules,which form actual statutory unitary allocating pattern and single class of stock. The logic bases of unitary allocating pattern include share equality,stockholders' homogeneity hypothesis, agency theory and complete structure principle of stockholders' rights. The inner defects of unitary allocating pattern include that stockholders' rights. Allocation can't reflect corporate autonomy,single class stock cannot satisfy stockholders' heterogeneous preferences,exercising outcome of stockholders' rights deviates from primary equality idea,and there is no headstream mechanism for protecting minor stockholders' rights. So,to push stockholders' rights allocation pattern from unitary to plural,we should make it an important content of corporate law next reform of China.

关 键 词：股东权利 股份公司 类别股份 公司自治 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]