网络借贷的逆向选择及其缓释机制研究  

Adverse selecting and its alleviation mechanisms in network lending

作　　者：林辉[1] 杨旸[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《东南大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第4期48-55,146-147,共8页Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA043);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71271110);中国经济改革研究基金会"互联网金融的风险与监管制度研究"课题;南京大学区域经济转型与管理变革协同创新中心"江苏‘互联网+’行动方案研究(金融)"成果之一

摘　　要：从分析逆向选择在P2P网络借贷中的形成原理出发,深入剖析网络借贷信用评级和债权标准化过程中潜在的逆向选择行为,可知,资信较差的融资者有通过隐瞒信息获取较高信用评级的动机;同时,平台具有利用优先行动优势事先筛选低质量贷款将风险传导给终端市场的可能性。本文针对以上问题提出相应的缓释机制和对策建议,以期对制定网络借贷监管政策提供决策依据。This paper thoroughly analyzes the formation principle of adverse selection in the P2 P network,and discusses the potential adverse selection in the process of credit rating and asset securitization. The results show that financing party with poor credit level has the concealment motivation for acquiring higher credit rating;and there is possibility that the platform uses priority action advantage to screen low quality loans and then transmits risk toterminal markets. The paper finally puts forward the alleviation mechanisms and countermeasures against theseproblems which can be helpful for the policy-making on network lending regulation.

关 键 词：互联网金融 网络借贷 逆向选择 缓释机制 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济] F832.4