启动融资融券助长内幕交易行为了吗?——来自我国上市公司的经验证据  

Does Margin Trading and Short Selling Promote Insider Trading?Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：张俊瑞[1] 白雪莲[1] 孟祥展[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《金融研究》2016年第6期176-192,共17页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71472148;71572144;71502138);财政部会计名家培养工程(财会[2015]5号)资助

摘　　要：本文以我国融资融券试点启动为背景,对融资融券可能引发的负面效应——内幕交易行为进行了检验。研究发现,融资融券启动后标的公司中发生内幕交易的可能性显著上升,且这种现象在规模较小、机构持股比例较高的公司中更加明显,而较好的外部法治环境能够约束上述行为,在法治水平较高的地区,融资融券对内幕交易的刺激效果减弱。研究结果表明,融资融券业务开展助长了内幕交易者的套利行为,但有效的法治治理能够起到一定的遏制作用。Based on the background of margin trading and short selling initiation in China, this paper devotes to test tile effect of the new trading mechanism on insider trading activities. The results show that the probability of insider trading turns out to be higher after firms＇ initiation of margin trading and short selling, especially among smaller firms or firms with higher institutional ownership. However, good legal environment could restrict such activities. The stimulation effect of margin trading and short selling on insider trading is attenuated for firms located in districts where the level of ruling by law is relatively higher. These results imply that margin trading and short selling stimulates insiders＇ arbitrage trading while effective government based on the rule of law has significantly deterrent effect on these trading behaviors.

关 键 词：融资融券 内幕交易 法治环境 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]