财政转移支付与地方征税行为  

Fiscal Transfer Payment and the Tax Behavior of Local Jurisdictions

作　　者：付文林[1] 赵永辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 [2]上海海关学院经济与工商管理系

出　　处：《财政研究》2016年第6期16-27,共12页Public Finance Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71373150)的阶段性研究成果;上海财经大学优秀博士学位论文培育基金项目(yb PY201501);2015年度银兴经济研究基金项目;上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2013-397)资助

摘　　要：财政转移支付的再分配功能有助于均衡地区间公共品的供给能力,但转移支付与地方税收的替代性也可能抑制地方政府的征税积极性。利用我国1999-2011年间的分省区面板数据,本文实证考察了转移支付对地方政府税收行为的影响,研究发现:转移支付总体上会抑制地方征税积极性;地方征税行为选择存在显著的策略替代特征;目前地区间财政竞争策略依然主要表现为税收优惠竞争。本文的研究意味着,规范地方政府的征税行为,不仅是要营造一个严格遵从税法的社会环境,还应优化转移支付制度实施中的激励机制。The redistribution effects of fiscal transfer payment could equalize the ability of local public goods provision among regions, yet the substitution effect between fiscal transfer grants and local taxation may also de- crease the tax effort of local jurisdiction. This paper estimates the effects of fiscal transfer payment on local tax ef- fort based on a panel data of China＇s provinces from 1999 to 2011. It shows that fiscal transfer payment would re- strain local tax efforts, especially decrease the tax effort of those financial fund net inflow provinces; there also has significant strategic complementary effect between local tax effort choices; at present, the main tactics of fiscal competition among regions is still tax preference, while the ＂yardstick competition＂ on public services is positive- ly associated with the local tax effort. The empirical results suggesting that, to strictly regulate local government tax behavior, man should not only improve tax compliance, but also optimize the incentive mechanism during the implementation of fiscal transfer payment.

关 键 词：转移支付 税收努力 财政外部性 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]