石油资源租国际分配博弈策略及影响分析  

Analysis on the Game Strategy of International Distribution of Petroleum Resource Rent and its Effect

作　　者：裴潇[1] 蒲志仲[1] 吴杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]长江大学管理学院

出　　处：《财政研究》2016年第6期42-56,共15页Public Finance Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"资源经济时代:矿产资源税制改革研究"(11AJY012)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：广义石油资源租由消费者剩余性质的潜在资源租和厂商剩余性质的市场资源租构成,国际油价及其决定的石油资源租国际分配,是世界及石油生产国和消费国社会经济发展的重要因素。理论模型表明,主要石油生产国集团通过产量控制、石油消费国集团通过石油消费税等策略争夺国际石油定价权,影响石油资源租的国际分配。为此,本文定量测算了1973年石油危机以来OPEC产量控制策略和欧盟石油消费税政策对石油资源租国际分配的影响。结果表明,1974~2012年石油资源租国际分配主要受OPEC产量控制影响,欧盟石油消费税政策对1986~2012年石油资源租国际分配也有重要作用。中国已是第一大石油净进口国,应以多功能石油消费税补偿石油消费外部性成本并分享更多国际石油资源租。The generalized Petroleum resource rent is constituted by potential resource rent, namely consumer surplus, and market resource rent, namely producer surplus. International oil price and its decision on the in- ternational distribution of petroleum resource rent are important factors of social and economic development of oil-producing countries and oil consuming countries. Market equilibrium theory shows that main oil-producing countries and oil consuming countries struggle for the international oil market pricing power using output control strategy and oil consumption tax policy respectively and affect the international distribution of petroleum re- source rent .Therefore, we measure the impact of the OPEC production control strategy and the European Union oil consumption tax policy on the international distribution of petroleum resource rent since the oil crisis of 1973. The results show that： The international distribution of petroleum resource rent was mainly influenced by OPEC output control strategy from 1974 to 2012, and it was also influenced by European Union oil consumption tax policy from 1986 to 2012. As the biggest oil net-importing country, China should adopt multi-functional oil consumption tax policy to compensate externality cost of oil consumption, and gain more international oil re- source rent.

关 键 词：石油资源租 石油输出国组织 石油消费国 石油消费税 

分 类 号：F109.1[经济管理—世界经济] F062.1