政府补贴与股价崩盘风险  

Government Subsidy and Stock Price Crash Rsk

作　　者：王超恩[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《财经论丛》2016年第8期12-20,共9页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：中国人民大学2015年度拔尖创新人才培育资助计划成果

摘　　要：本文以中国A股市场2007-2014年上市公司的数据为样本,基于企业寻租理论,实证检验了政府补贴对股价崩盘风险的影响,旨在为财政政策经济后果的研究提供新的经验证据。研究发现,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正相关关系;在制度环境水平较低的地区,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;在产业政策支持的行业,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;进一步分析表明,企业寻租是两者正向关系的主要原因。本文的研究结果表明,管理层可以借助政府补贴粉饰公司业绩和隐藏公司负面消息。Using A-share listed firms in China in the period of 2007-2014 as samples , this paper investigates the rela-tionship between government subsidy and stock price crash risk from the perspective of rent -seeking, so as to provide new em-pirical evidence to clarify the economic consequences of fiscal subsidies.We find that government subsidy is positively associ-ated with stock price crash risk.Results show that the impact of government subsidy is more pronounced in firms located in re -gions with low institutional environment and industry supported by government industrial policy .Further analysis indicates that rent-seeking does affect this positive realtionship.According to the rent-seeking theory , the executives can make use of the government subsidy to “disguise” the accounting performance and hide the negative news about the firm.

关 键 词：政府补贴 寻租 股价崩盘风险 

分 类 号：F235.99[经济管理—会计学]