基于演化博弈的建筑工人流动行为研究  

Research on Construction Worker' Mobility Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：孙继德[1] 王新成[1] 申良法 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《建筑经济》2016年第8期92-96,共5页Construction Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71472139)

摘　　要：建筑劳务市场处于不完全信息条件下,建筑工人流动与用工企业挽留呈现动态博弈关系。运用演化博弈论的思想和方法,构建演化博弈模型,分析不同条件下演化稳定策略,探索用工单位的挽留措施对建筑工人流动行为的影响。结果表明,目前用工模式下,用工单位是否采取挽留措施,建筑工人均会选择流动。政府作为第三方,应该积极推动目前用工模式改革,引导建筑工人有序流动。Assuming that each party has incomplete information about the other in construction labor market,forms a dynamic game relationship between employers＇ incentive retention and construction workers＇ mobility behavior. The paper analyzes the various conditional evolutionary stable strategies and explores how employer behavior influences construction workers＇ mobility behavior by use of evolutionary game theory. The results show that under the prevailing employment pattern,construction workers are bound to mobile whether their employers adopt incentives to retain them or not. The goverment as the third party,should reform the prevailing employment pattern to guide construction worker mobility orderly and rationally.

关 键 词：建筑工人 流动行为 演化博弈 稳定状态 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]