论布莱克对怀疑主义难题的回应——一种建立在语境主义基础上的新摩尔主义  

On Black's Response to Skepticism——A neo-Mooreanism based on contextualism

作　　者：杨修志[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学思想政治理论教学研究部,南京210037

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2016年第4期57-61,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究项目"德性知识论视域下的理解问题研究"(2015SJB031);南京林业大学青年科技创新基金"走出语境主义的困境--新摩尔主义研究"(CX2015031)

摘　　要：德娄斯将敏感性原则作为语境主义的主导性原则,而这一原则却招致了诸多的异议。同德娄斯的语境主义一样,布莱克的反怀疑主义理论也是建立在敏感性原则基础上的。布莱克关注到了敏感性原则的异议及困境,但他并没有像一些知识论者那样就此抛弃敏感性原则,而是采取了一种较为温和的方式。布莱克的思路是对语境主义的敏感性原则所招致的异议加以修正,提出一种弱化的敏感性原则,并进一步揭示出在反怀疑主义理论中采纳敏感性原则的合理性。DeRose took the sensitivity principle as the leading principle of eontextualism. However, this principle suffers a number of objections. Like DeRose＇ s eontextualism, Black＇ s theory of anti-skepticism is also based on the sensitivity principle. Black also paid attention to the objection and trouble of sensitivity principle, but unlike other epistemologists, he took a more moderate approach rather than abandoned the principle altogether. Faced with the objection, Black tried to modify the principle and put forward a weakened sensitivity principle, and further re- veal the reasonableness of adopting the sensitivity principle in the theory of anti-skepticism.

关 键 词：怀疑主义 新摩尔主义 敏感性原则 信念形成的方法 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]