科技基础条件平台合作创新中的利益分配博弈模型构建  

Game Model of the Profit Allocation Mechanism in Cooperative Innovation of the Science and Technology Basic Condition Platform

作　　者：高亮[1] 冯楚建[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学公共事务学院,安徽合肥230026 [2]科技部科技经费监管服务中心,北京100038

出　　处：《中国科技论坛》2016年第8期12-16,共5页Forum on Science and Technology in China

基　　金：西藏自治区科技计划研究项目(Z2014R91F0101);中国博士后科学基金第58批(2015M582017)

摘　　要：本文利用Stackelberg博弈模型,分别构建科技平台与一个外部机构和与两个外部机构合作的利益分配模型,进行对比分析得出四个重要结论,科技平台要保证合作成功,必须采取"选择性合作",特别是随着外部合作机构的增多,要求选择性合作的条件越来越严格。最后对结论进行分析和提出相关的对策建议。By constructing a Stackelberg game model, the paper respectively builds the profit allocation model of platform of science and technology with an external institutions and with two external agencies. And then it compares and analyzes technology platform to gel four important conclusions. To ensure the successful cooperation, the platform must take ＂ selective＂ cooperation, especially along with the increase in external cooperation agencies, selective cooperation conditions more and more strict. Finally, it analyzes the conclusion and puts forward relevant measures.

关 键 词：科技基础条件平台 合作创新 利益分配 

分 类 号：G301[文化科学]