信息不对称的土地违法静态监管博弈模型建立及求解  

A Game Theory-Based Monitoring Model on Illegal Land Use

作　　者：张甜[1] 廖和平[1,2] 庄伟[3] 潘卓[4] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学地理科学学院,重庆400715 [2]西南大学国土资源研究所,重庆400715 [3]西南大学历史文化学院,重庆400715 [4]西南大学人事处,重庆400715

出　　处：《西南大学学报（自然科学版）》2016年第8期120-127,共8页Journal of Southwest University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划项目(2013BAJ11B02);重庆市国土资源和房屋管理局科技计划资助项目(KJ200803)

摘　　要：对基于信息不对称的土地违法利益相关者行为倾向和矛盾冲突进行解析,探讨土地管理者监管成本、收益、损失和土地使用者收益、损失之间的影响和制约关系,求得监管博弈模型的混合策略纳什均衡解,并针对土地管理者的监管频率和监管范围进一步分析,从而建立土地违法调控机制,以达成土地管理部门的利益均衡目标.The illegal 1 does not conducive to benefit conflict and be and re mixed strict strat rmland protection, harms the benefit of the people and le development in a long time. The author analyzes the ~rs based on the land illegal use, discusses the influence land users on supervision gains and losses, obtains the el, and then analyzes supervision frequency and over- sm to solve illegal land use problems for the balance of and use endangers national fa social stability and sustainabl havior tendency of stakeholde ion relations between land managers and egy Nash-equilibrium of the game mod sight, provides suggestions and regulatory mechani stakeholders＇ interests.

关 键 词：土地管理 土地违法 博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]