出口贸易如何影响高学历劳动力就业——兼论出口贸易就业筛选机制的实现  

How does Export Influences the Employment of the Highly-educated Labor Force:The Realization of the screening mechanism

作　　者：陈昊[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济研究院,北京100029

出　　处：《产业经济评论》2016年第4期107-121,共15页Review of Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"开放转型背景下我国出口贸易就业偏向效应研究"(14CJL024)

摘　　要：本文构建了一个基于筛选-匹配机制的微观劳动力市场模型,旨在回答如下问题:(1)出口贸易是否提高了高学历劳动力的就业水平?(2)为什么出口贸易就业筛选机制带来整体就业水平的降低,而我们观察到的经验证据往往是出口贸易提高了就业水平?(3)政府促进出口的相关政策如何影响出口贸易与高学历劳动力就业之间的关系?研究发现,由于出口企业设立了更高的筛选门槛,且出口贸易强化了学历的信号显示作用与竞争胜出作用,因而出口提高了高学历劳动力的就业水平。然而,当企业与劳动者形成长期博弈预期后,触发战略的形成导致出口贸易就业筛选机制逐渐显著,因而出口贸易可能降低整体的就业水平。此外,出口补贴与出口退税虽然削弱了企业的筛选意愿,却能够在不同学历水平劳动者之间进行就业需求的重新配置。This paper constructs a microcosmic labor market model based on screening and matching mechanism,in order to answer the following questions： （1） Whether or not does export trade improve employment level of highly educated labor force？ （2）Why does export trade employment screening mechanism reduce the overall level of employment, but the empirical evidence we have observed is often that the export trade increases the level of employment？（3）How do government policies intending to promote export exert influence on the relationship between export trade and employment of highly educated labor force？ Studies have found that, due to export enterprises setting up a higher screening threshold, and the export trade strengthens the degree of signal displaying effect and competition winning effeetBthus export increases employment of highly educated labor force. However, when the enterprises and workers form a long-term game expectation, the formation of trigger strategy leads to the gradual significance of export trade employment screening mechanism, thus the export trade may reduce the overall level of employment. In addition, though export subsidies and export rebate weaken screening will of enterprises, it is able to reconfigure employment demand between workers of different educational levels.

关 键 词：出口贸易 就业 触发战略 信号显示 竞争胜出 

分 类 号：F752.62[经济管理—国际贸易] F249.2[经济管理—产业经济]