具有风险规避销售商的供应链最优回购契约  

Optimal Buy-back Contracts for a Supply Chain with a Risk-averse Retailer

作　　者：代建生[1] 秦开大[1] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2016年第7期72-81,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71462023;71362025);云南省应用基础研究计划面上项目(2016FB114);昆明理工大学人才培养基金资助项目(KKSY201408067)

摘　　要：在销售商风险规避下,运用CVaR方法研究了供应商在直营渠道(集中式供应链)和非直营渠道(分散式供应链)下回购契约的设计问题。刻画了集中式供应链下回购契约完成渠道协调的充要条件,求解了分散式供应链的最优回购契约。比较分析了集中式和分散式供应链下回购契约的差异,得到以下结论:相对于集中式供应链,供应商在分散式供应链中趋向于设定更高的批发价格,或更低的回购价格。讨论了销售商的风险规避度对契约设计和供应商收益的影响,研究表明:销售商越规避风险,供应商的收益越低。最后提供一个案例讨论了模型在现实中的应用。In a supply chain led by a supplier,the supplier always can employ contract mechanisms to coordinate the supply chain（SC）so as to improve efficiency of the channel.In many cases,the supplier can make use of different kinds of distribution channels,such as direct channels and indirect channels,hereafter refered to as centralized SC and decentralized SC respectively,to deliver commordities to the terminal market.Does there exist differences in contract arrangement in the two channels？The issue on coordination of the SC is investgated via buy-back contracts,where the supplier has a direct channel and an indirect channel,both with a risk-averse retailer.A model including two stages of game is constructed,where the aversion of the retailers are measured by the conditionally risk-at-value（CVaR）,and the supplier maximizes expected profits of the entire SC and its own,respectively,in the centralized SC and the decentralized SC.The model is solved out by backwards solving techniques.Necessary and sufficient conditions are characterized to coordinate the channel via buy-back contracts in the centralized SC.The optimal buy-back contracts are solved out in the decentralized SC.Furthermore,a comparative analysis is presented on the buy-back contracts between the two channels.It shows that the supplier tends to set a higher wholesale price or a lower buyback price in the decentralized SC than that in the centralized SC,which leads to that the retailer orders less than the optimal order quantity for the sake of the entire SC.Furthermore,a sensitivity analysis is made on the impact of the retailers＇ risk aversion on parameters of buy-back contracts,the retailer＇s ordering decision and the supplier＇s payoffs.It shows that the supplier always tends to set a lower wholesale price,given the buy-back price,and attains a smaller expected profit,whether in the centralized SC or in the decentralized one,if the retailer becomes more risk-averse.Therefore,the supplier is more willing to cooperate with retailers with a low

关 键 词：集中式供应链 分散式供应链 回购契约 条件风险价值 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] F274