基于信息生产的银企多阶段博弈分析  

On Multistage Game between Banks and Enterprises Based on Information Production

作　　者：孙燕红[1] 张美菱 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第6期67-72,共6页Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics：Social Sciences edition Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101135)

摘　　要：中小企业是中国社会主义市场经济中重要的组成部分,是拉动中国经济增长的一个重要动力。但是与其贡献不相符的是,其占有的融资资源却不到1/4,中小企业融资难的问题仍然很严峻,关系型贷款最终应运而生。信息生产是影响关系型贷款能否顺利开展的关键因素,鉴于信息生产的重要性和关系型贷款的长期性,运用信号传递博弈模型对关系型贷款策略进行了研究,指出企业如何配合银行的信息生产以及银行如何根据企业的信号传递作出正确的预期,为中国发展关系型信贷提供新策略。Small and medium-sized enterprises take an important part in China, s economy, a driving force for nationaleconomic growth. But their contribution does not match its share of financing resources, which takes less than 1/4.With the severe financing problem of SMEs, relationship lending eventually came into being. Information productionis the key factor influencing the relationship lending. This paper uses the signaling game model to explore relationshiplending strategy in view of the long-term importance and information production of relationship lending. The paperputs forward some suggestions on how the enterprises cooperate with the bank, s information production and how thebanks make the right strategies according to the signal transmission. The paper also provides new strategies for the developmentof relationship lending in China.

关 键 词：关系型贷款 信息生产 软信息 信号博弈 声誉模型 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]