我国出口信用保险项下贸易融资发展研究——基于出口企业、保险公司、银行三方的博弈分析  

A Study on the Development of China's Trade Financing under Export Credit Insurance—An Analysis Based on the Game among the Export Enterprise,Insurer and Bank

作　　者：王国军[1] 王德宝[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学保险学院,北京100029 [2]中国出口信用保险公司,北京100033

出　　处：《保险研究》2016年第7期44-54,共11页Insurance Studies

基　　金：对外经济贸易大学"211工程"第四期建设项目"老龄化背景下的社会风险管理研究"(编号8110060122)成果之一

摘　　要：出口信用保险项下的贸易融资可以实现出口企业、保险公司、银行三方共赢,但近年来出现了信息不对称状况恶化、银行融资政策收紧、业务规模下滑等问题。现行机制下,保险公司的加入并未缓解传统信贷关系中银行与融资企业之间的信息不对称状态,反而滋生了新的逆向选择和道德风险。通过三方博弈分析可知,出口企业出于"理性"会选择不诚信行为,甚至与保险公司合谋骗取银行融资,特别是在银行管控无效的情况下。基于博弈过程及均衡结果,认为出口企业应积极向银行和保险公司传递降低信息不对称的信号,保险公司制度设计上要建立与银行的风险信息共享与有效互动合作机制,银行应加强对出口企业贷前贷中贷后的全过程风险管控。The trade financing under export credit insurance can achieve a win-win situation among export enter- prise, insurance company and bank. But in recent years, there has been the deterioration of information asymmetry, the tightening of bank financing policies, the decline in business size and other issues. Under the current mecha- nism, the insurance company＇ s entry does not alleviate the information asymmetry between banks and financing companies in the traditional credit relationship, instead, it breeds new adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Through the analysis of the three party game, the export enterprise would choose not to act in good faith out of con- sideration for personal interest, even conspire with the insurance company to cheat for bank financing, especially in the case of ineffective control of the bank. Based on the game process and equilibrium results, the export enterprise should actively transfer information to bank and insurance company to reduce asymmetric information, the insurance company should establish the risk information sharing and effective interactive cooperation mechanism with the bank, and the bank should strengthen the risk management and control of the whole process of the export enterprise.

关 键 词：出口信用保险 贸易融资 信息不对称 博弈 

分 类 号：F840.6[经济管理—保险]