废弃电器电子产品处理补贴政策优化、退出与税收规制  

Subsidy Policy Optimization and Exit,and Tax Regulation for Disposal of Waste Electric and Electronic Products

作　　者：高艳红[1,2] 陈德敏[2] 谭志雄[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆401331 [2]重庆大学可持续发展研究院,重庆400044 [3]重庆大学公共管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2016年第4期725-732,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(12&ZD209);重庆师范大学人才引进/博士启动基金资助项目(15XWB012);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2012M511898)

摘　　要：从我国现行废弃电器电子产品回收利用补贴政策入手,构建现行补贴模型并对其实施机制进行数学分析;引入竞争性激励因素,提出现行补贴政策的优化模型,分析比较两者分别在决策均衡时的政策效果;理论上推算出政府基金补贴政策的退出临界点(或终止点),推导出废弃电器电子产品回收处理企业自主经营、自负盈亏的努力边界;并分析在补贴政策退出后,企业行为以及政府治理企业负外部性的税收规制机理。结果表明:补贴优化模型比现行补贴模型的政策效果更加明显;当补贴额度达到一定边界时,取消基金补贴政策,回收处理企业可以实现自主盈利;在政府基金补贴政策结束后,回收处理企业不会主动追加投资实施环保拆解处理;为解决企业负外部性,向其进行税收规制是该阶段政府的重点政策导向。Focusing on the current subsidy policy for disposal of waste electric and electronic products,we build a mathematical model and analyze its implementation mechanism.By introducing the competitive incentive factors,we construct an optimization model of the current subsidy policy,analyze and compare the policy effect on the decision-making equilibrium.We theoretically calculate the exit point（or end point）of the fund subsidy policy,and derive the effort boundary of the waste electric and electronic products recycling enterprises to operate independently.We then analyze the behavior of the enterprises and the mechanism of the tax regulation to avoid the negative externality of the subsidy policy.The results show that：the policy effects of the optimization subsidy mode is more significant than the current subsidy mode;when the amount of subsidies reaches a certain threshold,canceling the subsidy policy makes the recycling companies to realize the profit independently;at the end of the subsidies,recycling companies do not take the initiative to increase investment to implement environmentally and friendly dismantling;inorder to deal with the negative externality of the enterprises,the tax regulation is a key policy of the government at the moment.

关 键 词：废弃电器电子产品 补贴政策 优化 退出 税收规制 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]