专利侵权诉讼适用法定赔偿的博弈分析  

The Game Theory Analysis on the Application of Statutory Damages for Patent Infringement in China

作　　者：袁晓东[1] 许艳霞[1] 蔡学辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院知识产权系

出　　处：《知识产权》2016年第8期75-82,共8页Intellectual Property

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"专利分散对我国战略性新兴产业自主创新的影响机理及政策研究"(编号:71373088)

摘　　要：近年来的实证研究表明,在确定专利侵权赔偿数额时,我国存在着大面积、广范围和高频率地适用法定赔偿的现象,并产生了专利侵权赔偿数额偏低的问题。基于民事诉讼构造理论,运用博弈的研究方法,以北京、上海和广东三地149份专利侵权二审民事判决书为样本,分析我国司法实践偏好法定赔偿的主要原因。研究结果发现:法定赔偿泛滥的重要原因,是部分权利人主动选择、被控侵权人消极默认和部分法官优先适用法定赔偿三方共同博弈的结果。Recent empirical studies indicate that statutory damages are widely and frequently applied when determining the compensation for patent infringement, whereby the patent infringement compensation tends to be low. Based on the theory of civil litigation structure, the paper examined, by way of game theory analysis, 149 patent infringement civil judgment made by the second instance trial courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, trying to fi nd out the reasons for the preference of statutory damage by Chinese judicial organs. The results prove that the prevalent of statutory damage is the outcome of the wrestling among three factors： the right owner＇s own choice, the accused infringer＇s passive acquiesce, and the preemption by judges.

关 键 词：专利侵权 法定赔偿 诉讼构造 博弈分析 

分 类 号：D923.42[政治法律—民商法学]