基于最优拍卖数量和资金再分配模型的碳市场有偿分配机制研究  

Allocation mechanism of carbon market based on the optimized auction and revenue recycling model

作　　者：陈波[1] 孟萌 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学财经研究院,北京100081 [2]广州碳排放权交易所,广东广州510260

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2016年第8期10-15,共6页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"我国碳交易市场连接及宏观调控机制研究"(批准号:71503288);北京市社会科学基金研究基地项目"京津冀应对气候变化公共资金机制研究"(批准号:14JDJGB006);广东省低碳发展专项资金项目"碳排放配额竞价机制研究";中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划;中国财政发展协同创新中心项目;中央高校基本科研业务专项资金

摘　　要：拍卖作为一种有偿分配机制已经确立为我国碳市场配额分配的基本方式之一,而拍卖机制的灵活运用以及与市场运行之间的关系也成为实践中亟待解决的难题。传统的排放权拍卖理论以政府收入最大化作为目标函数,并没有将企业预算和交易策略纳入到分析框架中,同时对于拍卖收入资金的再分配方法缺乏可行的指导。本文将企业的成本约束(或预算)作为一个因素引入,提出了最优拍卖数量模型以及基于双重红利思想的资金再分配模型。分析表明最优拍卖数量由企业的边际减排成本和二级市场弹性系数决定,二级市场弹性系数则取决于排放的不确定性水平;边际减排成本越高的企业,其承受的拍卖成本随着拍卖价格增长越快,这可能导致减排空间小的企业承担的拍卖成本增长过高,从而产生不公平问题,因此本文提出了一种基于多轮竞价的资金分配策略,根据企业参加拍卖的投标情况间接评估企业的边际减排成本水平,并制定相应的补贴标准。最后以广东碳市场为例,从市场结构、履约成本、市场价格三个方面深入讨论了拍卖对碳市场的影响以及最优参数的选择策略。广东的经验为拍卖机制的引入提供了良好的建议:在二级市场流动性不足,价格发现能力较弱的情况下,引入拍卖机制可以快速建立一级市场的价格发现机制;由于历史法的不可靠,拍卖会将履约成本分配不合理的问题进一步放大,加剧市场的不公平问题,甚至出现劣币驱逐良币的现象,但拍卖收入资金的循环利用可以在一定程度上纠正这一问题;短期内拍卖底价是政府建立市场预期的辅助工具,是在二级市场供求关系尚未建立时的一种过渡手段,但从长期来看随着二级市场的成熟,底价政策应该逐渐放松或退出,建立起一级市场价格与二级市场价格联动的定价机制。Auction has been taken as a basic allocation approach of carbon allowance by China＇s carbon market. Hence the flexibility of auction and its correlation with the secondary market has also become a new issue for the development of carbon market. The conventional permits auction theory treats the revenue as the target function whilst the carbon budget is not considered properly and the realloeation of revenue has not been investigated carefully. The paper takes the carbon budget of entity into consideration and proposes an optimized auction model and a revenue recycling model based on double-dividend theory. Analysis indicates that the optimized quantity of carbon auction is decided by the marginal abatement cost and the elastic factor of the secondary market reflecting the emission uncertainty level. And the entities with higher marginal abatement cost would afford more carbon costs which might lead to unfairness. Therefore, the paper puts forward a revenue allocation approach by estimating the marginal abatement cost according to the biding information of entities. Furthermore, Guangdong ETS is discussed as a case to explore the correlation of auction and carbon market from the aspects of market structure, compliance cost and pricing. The experience of Guangdong ETS indicates that the auction mechanism could improve the pricing process when the market liquidity is poor. However, the grandfathering approach might cause unfairness issues which can be settled by auction revenue recycling. Besides, although the floor price of allocation is auxiliary method to establish market expectation, the floor price should be relaxed along with the development of the secondary market.

关 键 词：碳市场 拍卖 资金再分配 

分 类 号：F062[经济管理—政治经济学]