政府主导农地流转的价格机制及政策效应研究  

Study on price mechanism and policy effect of government-dominated rural farmland management rights' transfer

作　　者：尚旭东 常倩[2] 王士权[2] 

机构地区：[1]中共农业部党校现代农业研究中心,北京102208 [2]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2016年第8期116-124,共9页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：农业部重大专项课题"农业现代化进程中农地承包经营制度与政策若干重大问题研究"(批准号:MOA2014zd01);农业部农村经济与经营管理司专项课题"家庭农场发展规范与支持政策研究"(批准号:JGS2014wt05)

摘　　要：为适应农村劳动力转移、解决今后谁来种粮、发展现代农业所衍生的政府主导农地流转现象,有其现实背景和政策逻辑,并能在短期内带来农地规模经营的正向预期。但现实中,很多时候政府行为很难"合意"其政策目标,这使得探究政府行为对农地流转市场和经营行为的影响及其政策效应具有农业供给侧结构性改革背景下的时代意义。基于此,本文依据全国11个国家现代农业示范区调研数据和资料,对政府主导行为对流转市场的分割、价格机制的作用,承包户询价逻辑的激励及短期平均成本的影响进行了分析,同时构建Translog形式成本函数,对政府主导和市场配置两种方式下的农地经营"成本弹性"进行了测度和估计。结果显示:1政府行为放大需求弹性诱致"地租乘数"促使流转价格溢价;2政府介入流转扭曲了流转市场供求关系,将原本市场配置下的供需均衡变为有利于"卖方垄断"的供需失衡;3承包户议价地位提升后基于"劳动力双重成本负担"的询价逻辑又助推了流转溢价的"棘轮效应";4依靠政府主导流转而非市场配置所形成的大规模农地经营,其成本弹性未显现可预期的小于1,即未出现规模效益与成本随规模扩张递减。政府行为与政策效应背离,有其深层次的认识误区及其行为逻辑谬误。表现在:一是错误认为推动农地规模流转可以实现农业规模经营是直接原因;二是执拗相信只要扩大农地经营规模就能提高劳动生产率是其主因;三是渴望借助农机替代劳动力进而实现规模效应和收益最大化,试图套用所谓的"工业化大生产理念"谋划农地经营是其动因所在;四是政府行为扰乱市场配置资源作用造成政策效应失灵。To solve issues on government-dominated rural farmland management rights transfer, and to adapt to the transfer of rural labors, are of realistic background and policy significance, and it would bring the forward expectations for farmland scale-operation in a short term. But in reality, for many times governments＇ behaviors are difficult to ＇coincide with＇ their policy objectives. To explore the influences and policy effects of circulation-markets and operators＇ management behaviors by government-dominated transfer is significant under the background of agricultural supply-side structural reform. So, based on the survey data and information from 11 national modern agricultural demonstration areas, this paper does the following analysis, including that government-dominated behavior making the segmentation of circulation markets, the role of price mechanism, the incentive of contracted households＇ inquiry logic and impact of SAC; at the same time, the paper builds the cost function with Translog form and estimates the ＇ cost elasticity＇ between government-dominated and markets＇ allocation. The results show that ： ① the ＇ rent multiplier＇ induced by government-dominated enlarges the demand-elasticity and improves the price of rural land transfer; ②governments＇ intervention distorts the relation of supply and demand, and change the balance of supply and demand under the markets＇ allocation into imbalance between supply and demand advantageous to the seller＇s monopoly; ③based on＇inquiry logic for price＇ based on ＇double cost burden of labor＇ ,it loosts the ＇ ratchet effect＇ on transfer premium, after negotiation status of contracted households is improved; ④cost elasticity of large-scale land management reliance on transfer of rural farmland management rights by government-dominated cannot appear the values less than 1, i. e. , the change can＇ t show the predictable cost decreasing and scale-economies. The deviation from government-behavior and policy- effect could hav

关 键 词：政府主导:农地流转 地租乘数 询价策略 成本弹性 

分 类 号：F301.22[经济管理—产业经济]