政治关联、政治成本与会计行为  

Political Connection,Political Cost and Accounting Behaviors

作　　者：涂建明[1] 马北辰[1] 盛怡婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2016年第4期47-55,共9页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"基于关系网络及专业胜任能力的我国资本市场财务独董选聘与财务信息质量监督研究"(项目编号:12YJA630111);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(项目编号:3214006413)

摘　　要：现有研究表明政治关联对企业行为具有深刻的影响,但较少关注我国制度背景下政治关联与政治成本之间的关系,以及受此影响的会计行为。以政治成本假说为理论基础,以"政治关联-政治成本-盈余管理行为"为分析路径,剖析了政治关联通过政治成本影响会计行为的内在机理。分析得出政治关联会借由政治成本来驱动企业隐藏利润的行为,并负面地影响到盈余质量,而且政治关联会借由政治成本来驱动企业的盈余管理方式组合。此外,政治关联通过政治成本驱动的企业盈余管理行为会产生一定的经济后果。The existing researches indicate that political connection has a profound influence on the enterprises＇ behavior. Howev- er, few of them has paid close attention to the relationship between political connection and political costs under the in- stitutional background of China, as well as the accounting behaviors on the basis of the background. Taking the political cost hypothesis as the theoretical basis, and considering such a research path as ＂ political connection - political cost - earnings management behavior＂, we could analyze the internal mechanism of the accounting behavior driven by political connections via political cost. We can find that enterprises＇ hiding profits will be driven by political connection via political cost, to influence enterprises＇ earnings quality negatively. Besides, political connections could have an impact on enterprises＇ choices of earnings management combination. In addition, enterprises＇ behaviors of earnings management driven by political connections via political costs would arise some economic consequences. The paper tends to expand the present researches on political connection and earnings management in China, and provides a research framework for revealing the characteristics of accounting behavior under political connections.

关 键 词：政治关联 政治成本 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F231[经济管理—会计学] F275[经济管理—国民经济]