基于委托—代理模型的我国深水油气合作激励机制研究  

Study On the Incentive Mechanism of Deepwater Oil and Gas Cooperation in China Based on Principle-Agent Theory

作　　者：仇鑫华[1] 王震 丛威[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学工商管理学院,北京102249 [2]中国石油大学能源战略研究院,北京102249 [3]中国石油规划总院经济所,北京100083

出　　处：《中国能源》2016年第8期21-24,共4页Energy of China

摘　　要：由于油气储量的不确定性特征,中国深水油气合作中存在由事前信息不完全导致的委托—代理问题,传统的财务指标分析不能解决该问题。本文在概述了中国深水油气合作特征的基础上分析了深水油气合作中存在的博弈关系,并进一步论证了合作双方之间存在委托—代理问题,基于此构建的理论模型对中国深水油气合作中的产品分成合同财税机制进行了优化。论文研究表明,现有合作模式对合作伙伴参与深水油气勘探开发激励不够有效,通过对财税指标的调整可以进一步激励合作伙伴并实现中方收益的大幅提高。The issue of principal-agent resulting from incomplete prior information does exist in China deep water petroleum cooperation because of the uncertainty characteristics of oil and gas reserves. The traditional financial index analysis can not solve the problem. The principle-agent problem in China deep water petroleum cooperation is demonstrated and a principal-agent model is established to analyze and improve the cooperation mechanism of China deep water oil and gas exploitation. The application results show that the cooperation mode gives weak incentive to the international oil company and the principal-agent model can increase the incomes of both the oil company and Chinese government by improving the fiscal items of deep water petroleum cooperation. The mechanism design method is a better way to promote the deepwater oil and gas development than taxation reduction.

关 键 词：深水油气合作 委托—代理问题 机制设计 产品分成合同 

分 类 号：F426.22[经济管理—产业经济] F125