论蒯因对模态谓词逻辑的批评  

On Quine's Animadversions on Quantified Modal Logic

作　　者：杨红玉[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]河南大学哲学与公共管理学院 [2]河南大学马佩逻辑研究中心

出　　处：《中州学刊》2016年第8期109-114,共6页Academic Journal of Zhongzhou

基　　金：河南省哲学社会科学规划项目"蒯因的逻辑哲学思想研究"(2014CZX006);河南大学青年科研人才种子基金项目"蒯因与西方逻辑哲学的当代发展"(0000A40563)

摘　　要：现代模态逻辑的建立和迅猛发展,是20世纪逻辑发展史上的里程碑事件,但蒯因对模态谓词逻辑一直持激烈的质疑和批评态度。蒯因认为模态谓词逻辑存在着三大理论困境,模态逻辑的倡导者们提出了三种对应的解决方案,而这些方案引发了新的问题。对模态谓词逻辑的反思不仅是一个逻辑问题,更是一个哲学问题,它对当下模态高阶逻辑的进一步发展和语言哲学的深入发展,都具有重要的启迪意义和参考价值。It has been Quine＇s finn conviction all through his life that quantified modal logic is full of disasters and he attributed the theoretical dilemmas of quantified modal logic into three kinds, which are opaque referentially, invalidity of the rule of existential generalization and committing essentialism. The advocates of modal logic then propose three corresponding defending strategies from a total introspection point of view. Quine＇s criticism on quantified modal logic has exceeded the scope of logic, which is not only a logical issue but also a philosophical one. Reflection on this phenomenon possesses theoretical value and significance for both high-order modal logic and contemporary analytical philosophy.

关 键 词：蒯因 克里普克 指称不明 本质主义 

分 类 号：B815.1[哲学宗教—逻辑学]