税收宏观调控中纳税人信赖利益之保护  

On the Protection of Taxpayer Reliance Interest in Tax Macro- Control

作　　者：张富强[1] 许健聪[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学法学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《法学杂志》2016年第9期67-77,共11页Law Science Magazine

基　　金：2014年国家社会科学基金项目"税收公平正义价值下房地产税立法的顶层设计研究"(项目编号:14BFX098);2013年教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"‘营改增’试点扩围与国民收入分配正义价值的实现"(项目编号:13YJA820065)的阶段性成果之一

摘　　要：在我国,税收宏观调控因经济发展需要而被频繁使用。无论经由税制变革还是征管调整的实施路径,其对纳税人信赖利益之损害都并不鲜见。这使税务当局和纳税人难以形成真正的良性互动,也引发了法治缺位与调控低效的"双重困境"。当务之急,应以税法上的利益均衡理念为指导,综合运用"存续保护""损失补偿"和"过渡措施"等实体制度,同时合理设置规范税收立法、约束行政裁量及落实损失补偿的保障程序,以为各类税收宏观调控构建有针对性的纳税人信赖利益保护机制。Tax macro - control is common in China to adapt the needs of economic development. But no matter implemented by tax reform or tax administration, it is likely to damage the reliance interest of taxpayers. As a result, it is hard to develop a benign relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers, which will further lead to double troubles including the lack of rule of law and the poor efficiency of macro - control. Now a task of top priority is to build a protection system for taxpayer reliance interest based on the principle of balance of interests. And it needs to take both substantial and procedural law system into consideration.

关 键 词：税收宏观调控 纳税人 信赖利益 

分 类 号：D922.22[政治法律—经济法学]