金融危机下产权性质与企业绩效的研究  

Public vs. Private Ownership: Evidence from 2008 Financial Crisis

作　　者：张天舒[1] 黄俊[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会计学院,上海201620 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2016年第8期48-59,157-158,共12页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71202044,71372038);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2013BGL006);上海对外经贸大学085工程建设项目;高原高峰学科的资助

摘　　要：利用2008年金融危机这一外生冲击,本文对危机下不同所有权性质企业的绩效进行了考察。研究发现,金融危机下国有企业业绩显著较私有企业差,表明私有产权在经济下滑时期具更高的经营优势;良好的公共治理环境有助于国有企业业绩的提高,表现为与私有企业绩效差距的缩小;有趣的是,竞争不仅没能提高国有企业业绩,相反,因为竞争危机下国有与私有企业的绩效差距拉大;最后,金融危机下国有企业经营的低效益主要源自无效率的投资和冗员。This paper studies how ownership type influences firm performance during 2008 financial crisis by modeling a fixed effect model based upon China listed company data. It is found that stated owned enterprises(SOEs) performed badly relatively to private firms under the crisis, which indicates that private ownership has operation advantage even in a slowdown economy. It is also found that a good public governance environment helps SOEs improve performance and reduce the gap between private firms' performance,while competition increases this disparity instead of advancing SOEs performance. Finally, that SOEs perform poorly in financial crisis is duo to inefficient investment and excessive employment.

关 键 词：金融危机 产权性质 公共治理 市场竞争 

分 类 号：F121.2[经济管理—世界经济] F275