不完全信息下三度价格歧视的有效性研究  

The Effectiveness of Third-Degree Price Discrimination Under Incomplete Information

作　　者：薛凤[1] 钱茜[1] 陈绍刚[2] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学成都学院文理系,四川成都611731 [2]电子科技大学数学科学学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2016年第16期52-60,共9页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71271043);项目名称:关联信用风险演化结构与传染机理研究;四川省科研项目(16ZB0449).项目名称:竞争状态下基于随机需求的两类价格歧视交互效应的研究

摘　　要：基于不完全信息静态博弈模型,讨论了相互竞争的两厂商在双方都掌握的线性需求函数和一方随机选取的线性成本函数这样的不完全信息情况下实施三度价格歧视的有效性问题,且给出了双方实施三度价格歧视的最优产量,最优价格以及最大利润公式,并把相关结论与基于完全信息静态博弈的三度歧视定价和不完全信息静态博弈的统一定价进行对比,得出了许多重要的结论.Based on incomplete information static game model, this paper discussed the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination under two competing manufacturers when they are in the situation of linear demand function which mastered by all and randomly cost function master by only one manufacturer. In addition, the paper gave the optimal output formula, the best prices formula and maximum profit formula which belong to both manufac- tures, furthermore it put the conclusion compare with the relevant formulas of third-degree price discrimination which based on complete information static game model and uniform pricing which based on incomplete information static game model and drew many important conclusions.

关 键 词：不完全信息静态博弈 古诺模型 三度价格歧视 期望利润 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F714.1[经济管理—产业经济]